Constitutional Law: If These Walls Could Talk: Giving Undue Deference to Religious Actors by Expanding the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine—Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered Augsburg Confession by Krahn, Jeremy D.F.
Mitchell Hamline Law Review
Volume 43 | Issue 1 Article 8
2017
Constitutional Law: If These Walls Could Talk:
Giving Undue Deference to Religious Actors by
Expanding the Ecclesiastical Abstention
Doctrine—Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Unaltered Augsburg
Confession
Jeremy D.F. Krahn
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mitchell Hamline Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Krahn, Jeremy D.F. (2017) "Constitutional Law: If These Walls Could Talk: Giving Undue Deference to Religious Actors by
Expanding the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine—Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered Augsburg




CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: IF THESE WALLS COULD 
TALK: GIVING UNDUE DEFERENCE TO RELIGIOUS 
ACTORS BY EXPANDING THE ECCLESIASTICAL 
ABSTENTION DOCTRINE—PFEIL V. ST. MATTHEWS 
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH OF UNALTERED 
AUGSBURG CONFESSION 
Jeremy D.F. Krahn†
I.   INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 305 
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW .................................................. 308 
A. Establishment Clause ......................................................... 308 
1. Competing Philosophies ................................................ 308 
2. The Lemon Test ......................................................... 309 
3. Excessive Entanglement ................................................ 312 
B. Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine ....................................... 314 
1. Origins: First Amendment ............................................ 314 
2. Evolution of the Doctrine in Supreme Court
Jurisprudence .............................................................. 315 
3. The Doctrine in Minnesota .......................................... 321
III. THE PFEIL DECISION .............................................................. 323
A. Facts and Procedure .......................................................... 323 
B. Minnesota Supreme Court Decision and Dissent ................. 325 
IV. ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 326
A. Neutral Principles of Law .................................................. 326 
B. Extending the Scope of the Ecclesiastical Abstention 
Doctrine to Avoid a “Complicated and Messy Inquiry” ........ 331 
C. Judicial Policy Making ...................................................... 332 
D. Future Ramifications ......................................................... 334 
1. Expanding the Narrow Applications of Absolute
       †   JD Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2018; BM Piano 
Performance, St. Olaf College, 2012. Thank you to Professor Michael Steenson for 
his insight and mentorship throughout the writing process. I would also like to 
thank the staff of Mitchell Hamline Law Review for their helpful suggestions and 
attentive editing. I dedicate this note to my family—Shirl, David, Ryan, and 
Danica. I would not be where I am or who I am today if it were not for their 
support. 
1
Krahn: Constitutional Law: If These Walls Could Talk: Giving Undue Defer
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
  
2017] PFEIL V. ST. MATTHEWS LUTHERAN CHURCH 305 
Privilege in Minnesota ................................................. 335 
2. Balancing Interests of Church and Defamed Victim
Through a Qualified Privilege ...................................... 340 
V.  CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 343 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls. 
Who steals my purse steals trash; ‘tis something, nothing; 
‘Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him, 
And makes me poor indeed.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the inception of the United States, the relationship 
between government and religion may be best characterized as a 
balancing act. The First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution unequivocally affirms an individual’s right to exercise 
his religion; yet, at the same time, it forbids the government from 
favoring one religion over another or favoring religion over non-
religion.2 Although some have recognized the seemingly 
paradoxical nature of the combination of the Free Exercise and 
Establishment clauses,3 government and religion have, for the most 
part, coexisted comfortably.4 
The United States has thrived as a nation that respects both 
the law of the land and one’s right to practice religion. However, 
the law of the United States and the teachings of one’s religion can, 
at times, be at odds.5 And while the judiciary generally precludes 
1.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3.
2.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. There is, of course, considerable debate as to how
these clauses should be interpreted—particularly how the Establishment Clause 
should be interpreted. See infra Section II.A.1. 
3.  See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) (“While the two Clauses
express complementary values, they often exert conflicting pressures.”); see also 
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970) (“The Court has struggled to 
find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in 
absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend 
to clash with the other.”). 
4.  See Developments in the Law—Religion and the State: II. The Complex
Interaction Between Religion and Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1612, 1612–19 
(1987). 
5.  See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014)
2
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/8
  
306 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
itself from adjudicating matters of an ecclesiastical nature, religion 
cannot always evade the authority of secular law.6 
The First Amendment also protects freedom of speech.7 While 
many have touted the benefits of a populace that promotes free 
speech,8 certain types of speech have been deemed unworthy of the 
First Amendment’s protections.9 The Supreme Court has, with 
qualification,10 rejected the notion that defamatory statements 
should be constitutionally protected.11 There is, after all, great 
value in one’s name and reputation.12 
(holding that a provision of the Affordable Care Act, as applied to for-profit 
closely held corporations, substantially burdened the free exercise of religion); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments prevented the state from compelling an Amish student 
to attend public school until the age of sixteen). 
6.  See infra Section IV.A.
7.  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”). 
8. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously likened freedom of speech to
“free trade in ideas,” otherwise known as the “marketplace” of ideas. Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But when men 
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . .”). Holmes’ 
contention—that the truth will ultimately prevail when presented with competing 
ideas—was evidently inspired by the writings of John Milton and John Stuart Mill. 
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 98 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Classics 
1988) (1859) (“He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that.”); 
Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 
(1984). 
9.  See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (holding that the First
Amendment does not protect statements deemed to be “true threats”); New York 
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (proscribing child pornography);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (limiting speech that is directed to 
incite or produce imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action).  
10. The Supreme Court has navigated the difficult realm of defamation by
requiring different standards of proof based on the status of the victim and 
content of the statement. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 
472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (not requiring plaintiff to prove damages unless state law 
so requires when plaintiff is a private individual and matter is not of public 
concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (requiring private 
plaintiff to prove falsity, fault as determined by the state, and actual damages when 
a statement implicates a matter of public concern); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring public figure plaintiff to prove 
falsity and actual malice). 
11.  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There
3
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In Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran of Unaltered Augsburg 
Confession,13 religious authority and civil law met at a crossroads. A 
church’s right to autonomy stood at odds with a defamation 
victim’s right to a remedy. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
a religious actor is not liable for statements that are made in the 
context of a church disciplinary proceeding when they are 
disseminated only to members of the church.14 The majority found 
that adjudicating a defamation claim in this context would 
excessively entangle the court with religion and therefore violate 
the First Amendment.15 Because the court did not apply neutral 
principles of law, which allow a court to adjudicate claims without 
touching religious doctrine, and because the court did not address 
the defamation claim on a statement-by-statement basis, its decision 
gave great deference to religious institutions.16 
This Note begins by exploring the history and evolution of the 
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine17 in the United States, including 
its current status in Minnesota.18 It then discusses the facts and 
procedure of Pfeil and outlines the rationale for the majority and 
dissenting opinions.19 Next, it analyzes the court’s decision and 
argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court ignored its own 
guidelines and extended the scope of the ecclesiastical abstention 
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the 
insulting or ‘fighting’ words.”). 
12.  Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart noted that the protection of one’s reputation reflects the “essential 
dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent 
system of ordered liberty.” Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 1. 
13. 877 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2016).
14.  Id. at 542.
15.  Id.
16.  Id. (“Ultimately, adjudicating Pfeils’ claims would . . . unduly interfere
with respondents’ constitutional right to make autonomous decisions regarding 
the governance of their religious organization.”). 
17. Ecclesiastical abstention is a judicial doctrine—originating from the First
Amendment—that “forbids courts from inquiring into religious doctrine, belief, 
discipline, or faith in order to resolve disputes over church property, church 
polity, or church administration.” Shea Sisk Wellford, Note, Tort Actions Against 
Churches—What Protections Does the First Amendment Provide?, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 193, 
194 (1994). 
18.  See infra Part II.
19.  See infra Part III.
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doctrine to a level beyond what United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence requires.20 Finally, it concludes that the Pfeil holding 
essentially gives a religious actor an absolute privilege to defame in 
church disciplinary proceedings.21 Ultimately, this Note suggests 
that the court should have used neutral principles of law, without 
invoking the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, to determine which 
statements could be adjudicated. 
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW
A. Establishment Clause 
To fully understand the nature of the ecclesiastical abstention 
doctrine, it is necessary to examine its roots in the First 
Amendment. In Minnesota, this means taking a closer look at the 
Establishment Clause.22 
1. Competing Philosophies
The proper interpretation and meaning of the Establishment 
Clause is a topic that is subject to considerable academic debate.23 
Soon after the inception of the First Amendment, some—most 
notably Thomas Jefferson—advocated for a “wall of separation 
between Church and State.”24 Jefferson, and those influenced by 
Enlightenment thinkers, envisioned a country that maintained “a 
perfect separation between ecclesiastical and civil matters.”25 
However, critics called attention to the flaws in this black-and-white 
approach, arguing that the First Amendment “does not say that in 
every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and 
State.”26 Rather, “it studiously defines the manner, specific ways, in 
20.  See infra Part IV.
21.  See infra Part V.
22.  See infra note 128–29 and accompanying text.
23. Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of
Constitutional Litigation, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1997). 
24.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 146, 164 (1878)). 
25.  See Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 98, 102 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Why Separate Church and State?, 85 OR. L. REV. 351 (2006) 
(advocating for a complete separation between church and state). 
26. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
5
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which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on 
the other.”27 
In modern times, the “wall of separation” interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause has essentially been replaced by a theory of 
complete neutrality toward religion.28 In other words, government 
cannot support religion over non-religion, nor can it favor one 
religion over another.29 While still supporting the ideology of 
separation between church and state, the neutrality principle does 
not advocate for hostility towards religion.30 
The Supreme Court has largely modeled its Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence on this principle since the mid-twentieth 
century.31 However, the Court has, at times, seemingly abandoned 
neutrality for a narrower reading of the Establishment Clause: the 
so-called “accommodation” approach.32 Unlike the Jeffersonian 
view—which seeks to preclude most, if not all, government 
involvement with religion—the accommodation approach 
advocates for a narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
in which government can more easily interact with religion.33 A 
narrow interpretation, the accommodationists argue, is more in 
line with the intent of the Framers of the Constitution.34 Whatever 
the original intent of the Framers or the individual philosophies of 
the Justices of the Supreme Court, it is clear that current 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is dictated by one case and the 
“ground rules” it established: Lemon v. Kurtzman.35 
2. The Lemon Test
In Lemon, the Court dealt with the constitutionality of a Rhode 
Island statute that sought to supplement the salaries of teachers 
27.  Id.
28.  Sedler, supra note 23, at 1339.
29.  Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985).
30.  Sedler, supra note 23, at 1339.
31.  Christopher B. Harwood, Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence in the Wake of Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. 
ACLU, 71 MO. L. REV. 317, 351 (2006) (“Last term, neutrality was the favored 
Establishment Clause principle. And, it has enjoyed that status for more than fifty 
years.”). 
32.  Id. at 352–53. See infra note 41 for an example of this approach in Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
33.  Sedler, supra note 23, at 1318 n.2.
34.  Harwood, supra note 31, at 352–53.
35. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6
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who taught secular subjects in parochial schools.36 In order to 
ensure that these teachers were teaching only secular subjects, the 
state required submission of the schools’ financial data and other 
records.37 The Supreme Court deemed the statute unconstitutional, 
ruling that the statute would require continuous state surveillance, 
which would lead to excessive entanglement of government with 
religion.38 In striking down the Rhode Island statute, the Court 
announced a new rule: A statute conforms to the Establishment 
Clause if (1) it serves a secular legislative purpose, (2) its principal 
or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it 
does not foster an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.39 Despite the widespread displeasure with the Lemon test in 
the academic community,40 it remains a benchmark for 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Indeed, all but one post-Lemon 
Supreme Court case involving the Establishment Clause has 
applied this test to resolve the issue at hand.41 
The three prongs of the Lemon test reflect the “cumulative 
criteria developed by the Court over many years.”42 The first prong 
(the “purpose prong”) determines whether the actual purpose of a 
statute or government action is to “endorse or disapprove of 
religion.”43 Although a law need not be unrelated to religion, it 
36.  Id. at 607.
37.  Id. at 607–08.
38.  Id. at 619 (“These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and
enduring entanglement between state and church.”). 
39.  Id. at 612–13.
40.  Sedler, supra note 23, at 1344.
41.  Id. at n.108. The one exception to this pattern came in Marsh v. Chambers,
where the Court interpreted the Establishment Clause through the lens of its 
historical background and the “intent” of the Framers. See 463 U.S. 783, 786–92 
(1983). In doing so, the majority concluded that the Framers of the Constitution 
did not intend for the Establishment Clause to prohibit prayer in the legislature. 
Id. at 788 (“Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did 
not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that 
Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued 
without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.”). Ironically, both 
Marsh and Lemon were authored by Chief Justice Burger. 
42.  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. Some have suggested that the first two prongs
were derived from School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963), and that the third prong was a result of the decision in Walz v. 
Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See William Van Alstyne, What Is “An 
Establishment of Religion”?, 65 N.C. L. REV. 909, 909 n.2 (1987). 
43.  See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
7
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must not abandon neutrality and act with the intent of promoting a 
particular point of view in religious matters.44 In order to make this 
determination, courts may need to take a close look at a 
government action “to ‘distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from 
a sincere one.’”45 The second prong (the “effect prong”) 
determines whether the practice, regardless of its purpose, 
“conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.”46 A law violates 
this prong if it is “fair to say that the government itself has 
advanced religion through its own activities and influence.”47 
The third prong of the Lemon test—the “entanglement 
prong”—is the prong most relevant in Pfeil, and it requires a 
determination of the degree of entanglement.48 Because a certain 
level of entanglement of government with religion is inevitable, 
and indeed permitted,49 it must be deemed excessive in order to 
violate the Establishment Clause.50 However, certain religious 
programs “whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in details 
of administration and planning” pose a risk of entanglement 
through government participation.51 It is therefore necessary to 
consider the relationship between the government and the 
religious entity, as well as other factors, to determine the level of 
entanglement.52 
44.  See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987). 
45.  See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (quoting
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
46. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
47.  Amos, 483 U.S. at 337. It is important to note that improper advancement
of religion by the government is not limited to direct means. The Supreme Court 
has gone so far as to suggest that social pressure should be accorded the same 
weight as more direct means of coercion. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312. 
48.  See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (“The test is
inescapably one of degree.”). 
49.  See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (“Interaction between
church and state is inevitable . . . and we have always tolerated some level of 
involvement between the two.”). 
50.  Id.
51.  Walz, 397 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing the risk that
government involvement in certain religious programs will politicize religion). 
52.  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971). The Court has
suggested that three factors should be considered when determining if 
entanglement is excessive: (1) “the character and purposes of the institutions that 
are benefitted,” (2) “the nature of the aid that the State provides,” and (3) “the 
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.” Id. 
8
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3. Excessive Entanglement
Given that not all government entanglement with religion is 
unconstitutional, it is useful to differentiate between cases deemed 
excessive from those permitted, particularly in the ecclesiastical 
realm. 
Courts have found the government to be excessively entangled 
with religion in a variety of contexts. In one case, a Connecticut 
statute provided workers with an absolute right to observe their 
Sabbath on any day of the week.53 The Supreme Court affirmed the 
lower court’s holding that the statute excessively entangled 
government with religion by requiring the state to decide which 
religious activities constituted an “observance of Sabbath” in order 
to assess an employee’s sincerity.54 In another case, a Baltimore city 
ordinance made it a misdemeanor to falsely indicate, with intent to 
defraud, that food complied with kosher standards.55 The Fourth 
Circuit held that the Baltimore ordinance, which required the 
employment of three ordained Orthodox Rabbis to enforce the 
kosher standards, would require the government to become 
excessively entangled with religion and would therefore violate the 
Establishment Clause.56 
Because entanglement must be excessive to be considered 
unconstitutional, it is not surprising that many relationships 
between government and religious institutions are permitted. In 
Bowen v. Kendrick, for example, the constitutionality of the 
Adolescent Family Life Act was challenged.57 This Act provided 
federal grants to public and private organizations “for services and 
research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and 
pregnancy.”58 Some of the grantees were religiously affiliated, 
which required the government to review the grantee’s educational 
53. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 706 (1985).
54.  Id. at 708.
55. Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1338
(4th Cir. 1995). 
56.  Id. at 1342 (stating that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face
because it “vest[ed] significant investigative, interpretive, and enforcement power 
in a group of individuals based on their membership in a specific religious sect”). 
The court further found that the city ordinance violated the “effect prong” of the 
Lemon test because it impermissibly advanced and endorsed the Jewish faith. Id. at 
1346. 
57. 487 U.S. 589, 589 (1988).
58.  Id.
9
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materials and monitor them with periodic visits to avoid First 
Amendment concerns.59 Although the Court acknowledged that 
some entanglement was necessary, it did not find the entanglement 
excessive and held the Act constitutional on its face.60 Likewise, the 
Supreme Court in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland61 ruled 
that annual audits of religiously-affiliated colleges and universities 
did not amount to excessive entanglement.62 In Minnesota, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. 
Hill-Murray High School held that lay faculty members at religious 
schools could collectively bargain without violating the 
Establishment Clause.63 The court reasoned that the subjects of 
negotiation (hours, wages, working conditions) were entirely 
secular terms of employment and therefore did not implicate First 
Amendment concerns.64 
Still, other courts have attempted to avoid a constitutional 
question altogether, electing instead to bypass the excessive 
entanglement question and defer to the decision of the religious 
organization. For example, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,65 
the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend that the 
59.  See id. at 615–17.
60.  See id. at 617.
61. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
62.  Id. at 767. These audits were performed in order to ensure that the aid
provided was being used for secular purposes. Id. at 742. In ruling that the 
entanglement was not excessive, the Court stressed that the audits performed 
would not likely be any more entangling than audits involved in the course of the 
normal accreditation process. Id. at 764. Additionally, the Court reasoned that the 
danger of political divisiveness would be substantially lessened because the aided 
institutions were not elementary or secondary schools. Id. at 765–66. 
63. 487 N.W.2d 857, 864 (Minn. 1992). In holding that the Minnesota Labor
Relations Act (MLRA) was intended to allow lay faculty members to collectively 
bargain, the court declined to “categorize th[e] minimal responsibility [of the 
duty to bargain about employment conditions] as excessive entanglement.” Id. 
“The first amendment wall of separation between church and state” did not 
prohibit limited government regulation of secular aspects at the school. Id. And 
although Hill-Murray’s holding was seemingly contradictory to NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), the court also highlighted the difference 
between the Congressional intent in creating the NLRA and the history and intent 
of the MLRA. Id. at 861–62. 
64.  Hill Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 863. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court
took care not to extend its holding past the faculty members’ ability to negotiate 
on conditions of employment. The court clarified that “doctrinal and religious 
issues are matters of inherent managerial policy and are nonnegotiable.” Id. at 87. 
65. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
10
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National Labor Relations Act would require parochial schools to 
recognize the unionization of lay faculty members.66 Accordingly, 
the Court declined to construe the Act in a manner that would 
require a deeper inquiry into First Amendment issues.67 
As these cases suggest, the mere fact that a court decides a case 
involving the government regulation of, or relationship with, a 
religious institution does not necessarily amount to excessive 
entanglement.68 Judicial scrutiny of the relationship between 
church and state only becomes problematic when courts are 
required to overrule a religiously based act or interpret religious 
doctrine.69 However, if a court can apply laws of general 
applicability (i.e., neutral principles of law), it can regulate the 
activities of a religious organization without implicating the 
excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test.70 
B. Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine 
1. Origins: First Amendment
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, which limits a secular 
court’s ability to decide matters associated with church doctrine,71 
finds its roots in the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.72 Although it is unclear from which exact source the 
doctrine is derived, it is generally understood to have developed 
from judicial interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause or the 
Establishment Clause.73 These clauses, which provide that 
66.  Id. at 506; see also St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 787–88 (1981) (holding that Congress did not intend 
religiously-affiliated schools to be subject to federal unemployment compensation 
laws). 
67.  Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 507.
68.  Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: A Revisit, 59
WAYNE L. REV. 589, 653 (2013). 
69.  Id.
70.  Id. at 655 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012)); see also infra Section IV.A. 
71. Jarod S. Gonzalez, At the Intersection of Religious Organization Missions and
Employment Laws: The Case of Minister Employment Suits, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 303, 309 
(2015) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724–25 
(1976)); see Shea Sisk Wellford, Tort Actions Against Churches–What Protections Does 
the First Amendment Provide?, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 193, 197 (1994). 
72.  Gonzalez, supra note 71, at 309.
73.  See Christopher R. Farrel, Note: Ecclesiastical Abstention and the Crisis in the
11
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“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,”74 seek to 
simultaneously lift government-imposed burdens on the exercise of 
religion and prohibit preferential treatment of a religion.75 
2. Evolution of the Doctrine in Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Most of the early cases that invoked the ecclesiastical 
abstention doctrine dealt with church property disputes.76 The 
framework for the doctrine was set in 1871 in Watson v. Jones.77 In 
Watson, two rival factions of a Kentucky Presbyterian Church were 
divided: the minority in favor of slavery and the majority opposed.78 
The church had recently purchased a parcel of land and conveyed 
the title to the trustees of the church, with the restriction that both 
the property and trustees follow the “fundamental laws” of the 
national Presbyterian Church.79 The General Assembly, the highest 
judicatory in the Presbyterian Church, instructed pro-slavery 
members of the church to “repent and forsake [their] sins before 
they could be received.”80 The pro-slavery faction, being staunchly 
opposed to this resolution, assumed control of the property and 
claimed that the requirement was contrary to the Church’s 
constitution.81 The General Assembly rejected this notion and 
declared the anti-slavery faction to be the rightful owners of the 
property.82 When faced with the decision of which faction was the 
Catholic Church, 19 J.L. & POL. 109, 116 (2003). 
74. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
75.  Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, The Free Exercise Boundaries of Permissible
Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE L.J. 1127, 1127 (1990). See 
generally 1 W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
LAW § 1.2, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2017). 
76.  See Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial
Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 511–14 
(2005). For an in-depth historical analysis of civil court adjudication of church 
property disputes, see Justin M. Gardner, Ecclesiastical Divorce in Hierarchical 
Denominations and the Resulting Custody Battle Over Church Property: How the Supreme 
Court Has Needlessly Rendered Church Property Trusts Ineffectual, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
235, 240–45 (2007). 
77. 80 U.S. 679 (1871); see also Farrel, supra note 73, at 116–17.
78.  See Watson, 80 U.S. at 690–91.
79.  See id. at 683.
80.  Id. at 691.
81.  Id. at 692.
82.  Id.
12
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/8
  
316 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
lawful owner of the property, the Supreme Court elected to defer 
to the ruling of the Presbyterian General Assembly because of the 
ecclesiastic nature of the issue.83 The Court outlined three principal 
reasons for its decision to defer. 
First, a church’s ability to make governance decisions is at the 
very heart of religious freedom and therefore should not be 
decided by civil courts.84 In other words, a court should be reluctant 
to interfere with internal affairs of private religious associations.85 
Interference in this area, according to the Court, “would lead to 
the total subversion of such religious bodies.”86 
Second, the Court justified its deference by analogizing to a 
contractual agreement.87 The Court acknowledged that there is an 
unquestioned right to organize voluntary religious associations, but 
all who associate themselves with such an organization implicitly 
consent to the laws and decisions of its governing body.88 The 
question then became whether the church polity was 
congregational or hierarchical,89 which would determine the type 
of deference shown. If the church was congregational,90 a 
83.  Id. at 732 (quoting German Reformed Church v. Com. ex rel. Seibert, 3
Pa. 282, 291 (1896)) (“The decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like every other 
judicial tribunal, are final; as they are the best judges of what constitutes an 
offence against the word of God and the discipline of the church.”). 
84.  Id. at 729 (“It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their
right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, 
that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, 
subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.”). The Court 
conceded that this philosophy contrasted with English doctrine at the time, which 
stated that it was the duty of the court to determine the standard of faith in the 
church. Id. at 727. 
85.  See Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy
and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1293 (1980). 
86.  Watson, 80 U.S. at 729.
87.  See id. (“All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied
consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.”). 
88.  Id. at 728–29. If civil courts could overturn religious tribunals on matters
of church doctrine, the Court argued, the purpose and influence of the religious 
tribunals would be meaningless. Id. at 729 (“But it would be a vain consent and 
would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by 
one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them 
reversed.”). 
89.  Id. at 722–23.
90.  Congregational churches are more autonomous than hierarchical
institutions. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1292 n.6. Because they do not 
generally recognize a superior authority, these types of churches govern 
13
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resolution would be determined according to the rules governing 
ordinary voluntary associations.91 If, however, the church was 
hierarchical92 in nature, the Court would defer to the highest 
church tribunal that had considered the conflict.93 Because the 
church at issue was hierarchical, the Court elected to defer to the 
ruling of the highest church tribunal: the Presbyterian General 
Assembly.94 
Finally, the Court recognized that civil courts do not 
necessarily possess the expertise or competence needed to 
interpret church doctrine.95 Given that many churches have “a body 
of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of [their] own,”96 review by a 
civil court would “be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in 
the law which should decide the case, to one which is less so.”97 
Therefore, the Presbyterian General Assembly would be in the best 
position to define the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church.98 
themselves and are “free to affiliate and withdraw from other church organizations 
at will.” Id. Examples include numerous Baptist churches, Jewish congregations, 
and Quakers. Id. 
91.  Watson, 80 U.S. at 725; see also Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1292–
93. For example, in the case of a land dispute with no clear title, a decision
reached by the majority of the congregation would be conclusive. Adams & 
Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1293; cf. Sedler, supra note 68, at 646 (“[W]hen the form 
of church organization is congregational rather than hierarchical, the courts may 
. . . apply general principles of contract and property law to determine which of 
the contending factions is entitled to the church property.”). 
92.  A hierarchical organization is defined as an organization of
churches “having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or 
ecclesiastical head.” Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1292 n.6 (quoting Kedroff 
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 110
(1952)). Examples include the Roman Catholic Church, Eastern Orthodox 
Church, and Presbyterian Church. Id. 
93.  Watson, 80 U.S. at 727; see also Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1293.
Scholars have noted the risk of granting this much power to a church tribunal. If 
the deference doctrine was strictly applied in these cases, a hierarchical church 
judicatory would have “almost unlimited authority over its associated churches.” 
Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1301–02. 
94.  Watson, 80 U.S. at 733–735.
95. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1293; David J. Overstreet, Does the
Bible Preempt Contract Law?: A Critical Examination of Judicial Reluctance to Adjudicate a 
Cleric’s Breach of Employment Contract Claim Against a Religious Organization, 81 MINN. 
L. REV. 263, 273 (1996). 
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In a similar case decided just one year after Watson, the Court 
once again heard a property dispute between two competing 
factions of a church.99 Like Watson, both divisions claimed to be the 
“true” church.100 Although the Court conceded that it could not 
resolve matters of church discipline, it still asserted authority to 
decide the property dispute at issue.101 In order to resolve the 
dispute, the Court was willing to inquire into the organizational 
structure of the church.102 
A pair of cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-
centuries modified the scope of Watson.103 In Brundage v. Deardorf,104 
the court stated that the deference shown in Watson did not extend 
to decisions made by a hierarchical church judicatory that were “in 
fraud of the rights of a minority seeking to maintain the integrity of 
the original compact.”105 A court is not obligated to defer to 
religious authority in the case of an “open, flagrant, avowed 
violation” of the church’s fundamental law.106 And the Supreme 
Court in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,107 although 
acknowledging the high level of deference shown to the decisions 
of church tribunals, indicated that an exception might be made in 
the case of “fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness . . . .”108 Although 
these cases were rooted in the contractual rationale of Watson and 
99. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 133–34 (1872).
 100.  Id. at 134. 
 101.  Id. at 139. 
 102.  Id. at 140. Ultimately, the Court found that the church was 
congregational. Id. Since a congregational church is represented only by the 
majority of its members, the actions of the small minority to excommunicate 
church members and trustees was held to be invalid. Id. 
103.  Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1302–03. 
 104.  55 F. 839 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893), aff’d, 92 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1899). 
Although Brundage was not a Supreme Court case, it is notable that the author of 
the opinion, Judge Taft, would later serve as Chief Justice during the term in 
which Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, infra note 108, was decided. 
See Frank Freidel and Hugh Sidey, William Howard Taft Biography, in THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2006), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/presidents/williamhowardtaft. 
 105.  Brundage, 55 F. at 847–48. 
 106.  Id. at 846. Since a violation of the original compact amounted to “a 
withdrawal from the lawful organization of the church,” the violating party was not 
entitled to the property in dispute. Id. 
107.  280 U.S. 1 (1929). 
 108.  Id. at 16. 
15
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did not implicate the First Amendment,109 subsequent cases were 
firmly grounded in the United States Constitution.110 
The deference rule in Watson was first recognized as a 
constitutional principle in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of 
Russian Orthodox Church.111 In Kedroff,112 a section of a New York 
statute proposed the transfer of administrative power in the 
Russian Orthodox churches of New York from the central 
governing authority in Moscow to the Russian Orthodox Church in 
America.113 Because the Russian Orthodox Church was 
hierarchical, the Court deferred to the highest governing body in 
Moscow.114 Thus, the section of the statute that attempted to 
transfer power was ruled unconstitutional because it violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment and proscribed the free exercise of 
religion.115 
The doctrine was affirmed once again in 1976 when the 
Supreme Court refused to overrule an Eastern Orthodox Church’s 
decision to defrock one of its bishops because adjudication would 
 109.  See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Church Autonomy 
Doctrine: Where Tort Law Should Step Aside, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 449 (2011) 
(explaining that since Watson was decided before the First Amendment was 
incorporated against the states, federal common law was used to justify the 
holding). 
 110.  See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 
(1976) (“For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive 
inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decision of the highest 
ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity . . . .”); Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) 
(discussing how the federal Constitution gives religious organizations the “power 
to decide for themselves, free from state [or court] interference”). 
 111.  See Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1303. The Kedroff Court found the 
rule to be implicit in the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Kedroff, 
344 U.S. at 116 (“Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of 
choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional 
protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.”). 
112.  344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
 113.  Id. at 97–99. 
 114.  Id. at 120. 
 115.  Id. at 107. Kedroff’s holding, applying to legislative action, was extended 
to include judicial action eight years later. See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 
363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960) (stating that abuse of state power is prohibited, whether 
by the legislature or judiciary, and reversing a state court’s judgment that 
reassigned control of Saint Nicholas Cathedral from the Russian Orthodox 
Church in Moscow to the Russian Church of America). 
16
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require “extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and 
polity,” thereby violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.116 
In doing so, the Supreme Court again recognized that the 
Constitution requires civil courts to give great deference to 
religious tribunals when addressing doctrinal issues.117 
In recent years, courts have extended the doctrine to exempt 
churches from following employment discrimination laws when 
making decisions regarding ministerial employees—a so-called 
“ministerial exception.”118 In other words, if a civil court were to 
enforce employment discrimination laws on churches, it would 
essentially be appointing and dismissing ministers, which would 
violate both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause.119 However, not all employment claims in the religious 
context have been denied. The Court has applied the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to a commercial business operated by a religious 
foundation120 and has applied a California sales and use tax to a 
religious organization’s sale of religious materials.121 
Although great deference has been given to church authority 
since Watson, it is clear that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine 
and its progeny do not grant infinite autonomy to a religious 
organization.122 If a court can apply “neutral principles of law”123 to 
116.  Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976). 
 117.  See Farrel, supra note 73, at 119–20. 
118.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 705–06 (2012). For an extended analysis of the ministerial exception and its 
relevance in Hosanna-Tabor, see Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-
Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2012); see also infra note 221 and 
accompanying text. 
 119.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. The Court has also clarified that 
Congress intended for church-affiliated schools to be exempt from federal 
unemployment compensation laws. St. Martin Lutheran Evangelical Church v. 
South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 784 (1981). 
 120.  See Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 306 
(1985). The Court held, in part, that the federal statute did not pose an 
entanglement issue. Id. at 305. The recordkeeping required by the statute was no 
more intrusive than other permitted government activities, such as fire inspections 
and building and zoning regulations. Id. at 305–06. 
 121.  See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 
397 (1990). The Court found no “constitutionally significant” entanglement in the 
administrative burdens that the law placed on the plaintiff. Id. at 394. 
 122.  See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979); Presbyterian Church in 
the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 
449 (1969); see also supra notes 104–10 and accompanying text. 
17
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resolve controversies involving religious organizations, adjudication 
of the merits does not involve “an internal church decision that 
affects the faith and mission of the church itself”124 and therefore 
does not violate the First Amendment.125 It is only when a claim 
implicates church doctrine that deference is required.126 
3. The Doctrine in Minnesota
Given that the First Amendment is applicable to the States by 
way of incorporation,127 the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is 
applicable in Minnesota. Although the United States Supreme 
Court has never endorsed a specific test when applying the 
doctrine, Minnesota courts have analyzed the ecclesiastical 
abstention doctrine under the Establishment Clause.128 Specifically, 
Minnesota courts have used the three-pronged test set forth in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman to determine whether a state action violates the 
Establishment Clause.129 
While the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is applicable in 
Minnesota, the state’s courts have frequently used neutral 
principles of law to avoid any First Amendment quandaries.130 This 
 123.  See Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 
426, 435 (Minn. 2002); Neutral Principles, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining neutral principles as “[r]ules grounded in law, as opposed to rules based 
on personal interests or beliefs”). 
 124.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
 125.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 126.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 127.  See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“The process of absorption of the religious guarantees 
of the First Amendment as protections against the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment began with the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
 128.  See, e.g., Odenthal, 649 N.W.2d at 435. 
 129.  Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)) (“[A] state 
action must have a secular purpose, must neither inhibit nor advance religion in 
its primary effect, and must not foster excessive governmental entanglement with 
religion.”); see supra Section II.A.2. 
 130.  See, e.g., Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 
N.W.2d 857, 863 (Minn. 1992) (holding that the Minnesota Labor Relations Act, 
which granted collective-bargaining privileges to parochial school employees, was 
a neutral law that did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Piletich v. Deretich, 
328 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. 1982) (holding that a court is constitutionally 
entitled to use neutral principles of law to determine church property ownership); 
Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254, 266 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) 
(holding that the district court could constitutionally examine religious 
18
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is what occurred in Geraci v. Eckankar, where a female systems 
analyst sued her religiously-affiliated employer for gender 
discrimination and defamation, among other claims.131 While 
declining to decide the plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim,132 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals saw no problem in considering the 
defamation claim.133 Even though the alleged incident was in a 
religious context, the court still applied the defamation analysis 
and ultimately held that the employer did not defame the 
plaintiff.134 
A similar use of neutral principles of law appeared in State v. 
Wenthe,135 where the Minnesota Supreme Court was tasked with 
determining the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited clergy-
parishioner sexual conduct occurring during the course of spiritual 
counseling.136 The Defendant argued that the “statute excessively 
entangle[d] the State with religion because it require[d] an inquiry 
into whether an individual [was] seeking religious or spiritual 
advice, aid, or comfort.”137 The court rejected this argument, noting 
that precedent permitted a court to determine whether advice 
given by a clergy member was “of a religious or spiritual nature.”138 
Because a court can make this determination by using neutral 
principles of law, the court reasoned, it does not become 
documents in order to apply neutral principles of law). 
131.  526 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 132.  Id. at 401. The court reasoned that the gender discrimination claim 
would require the court to question the employment decisions of the church. Id. 
(“[W]e cannot devise a way to determine if this reason for termination was a 
pretext for discrimination without questioning the reasons for the 
excommunication and the veracity of those reasons.”).  
 133.  Id. at 397–98. 
 134.  Id. at 397. The court held that the plaintiff was not defamed because the 
statements did not refer to her specifically and could not be proven false. Id. 
135.  839 N.W.2d 83 (Minn. 2013). 
 136.  Id. at 86–87. 
 137.  Id. at 91. 
 138.  Id. (Hanson, J., plurality opinion) (quoting State v. Bussmann, 741 
N.W.2d 79, 89 n.5 (Minn. 2007)). The court also recognized that similar inquiries 
were permitted in the context of clergy-penitent privilege. Id. (citing State v. 
Rhodes, 627 N.W.2d 74, 85–86 (Minn. 2001); State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 216 
(Minn. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 909 n.4 
(Minn. 1996)). 
19
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excessively entangled with religion.139 Accordingly, the statute was 
held to be constitutional.140 
In Odenthal v. Minnesota Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,141 
the Minnesota Supreme Court established the analytical framework 
for adjudicating tort claims against religious organizations.142 The 
plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist church, brought a 
variety of claims against his former minister—most notably one for 
negligent counseling.143 In holding that the district court had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the negligence claim, the court reasoned 
that the statutory definition of “mental health practitioner” could 
be interpreted without implicating religious doctrine, and 
therefore the court did not excessively entangle itself with the 
church.144 
As these cases demonstrate, neutral principles of law have 
been embraced and utilized by Minnesota courts for years. 
Although adjudication of matters involving church doctrine and 
polity is still forbidden, Minnesota courts have used neutral 
principles of law as an alternative method to adjudicate certain 
lawsuits while preventing excessive entanglement with religion. 
III. THE PFEIL DECISION
A. Facts and Procedure 
LaVonne and Henry Pfeil (“Pfeils”) were devoted members of 
St. Matthew Evangelical Lutheran Church in Worthington, 
Minnesota,145 a church associated with the Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod.146 
 139.  Id. at 91–92. 
 140.  Id. at 92. 
141.  649 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2002). 
 142.  See Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered 
Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 542 (Minn. 2016) (Lillehaug, J., 
dissenting); infra Section IV.A. 
 143.  Odenthal, 649 N.W.2d at 429. 
 144.  Id. at 438. 
145.  Although the church’s legal name is “St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of the Unaltered Augsburg Confession of Worthington, Nobles County, 
Minnesota,” the church refers to itself as “St. Matthew” and is referred to as such 
throughout this Note. Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 530 n.1 (majority opinion). 
 146.  Id. at 530–31. 
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On August 22, 2011, the Pfeils received notice that they had 
been excommunicated from the church for misconduct.147 In this 
letter, signed by St. Matthew’s pastors Thomas Braun (“Braun”) 
and Joe Behnke (“Behnke”), the Pfeils were accused of engaging in 
“slander and gossip” against the church.148 Shortly thereafter, the 
leadership and congregation of St. Matthew held a special meeting 
to affirm or reject the Pfeils’ excommunication.149 The meeting 
attendees, after being presented with the August 22 letter that 
outlined the allegations, voted to affirm the excommunication.150 
In March 2012, a Missouri Synod panel agreed to hold a 
hearing to reconsider the excommunication, but the decision was 
affirmed.151 It was during this hearing that Behnke allegedly stated 
that the Pfeils had accused him of stealing money from the 
church.152 The Pfeils subsequently brought a lawsuit against St. 
Matthew, Braun, and Behnke (collectively, “respondents”), 
asserting claims for defamation and negligence.153 
Relying on the First Amendment and the ecclesiastical 
abstention doctrine,154 the Nobles County District Court granted 
respondents’ motion to dismiss after determining it was precluded 
from ruling on the Pfeils’ claims due to lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.155 The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court’s finding, reasoning that the ecclesiastical abstention 
doctrine barred an inquiry into the excommunication 
 147.  Id. at 531. 
 148.  Id. Among other allegations, the letter also claimed that “[t]he Pfeils 
engaged in behavior unbecoming of a Christian” and “intentionally attacked, 
questioned, and discredited the integrity” of church leaders. Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. Henry Pfeil died in April 2012, and Lavonne Pfeil was named trustee 
for Henry’s claims. Id. at 531 n.3. 
 154.  Id. at 532. 
 155.  Id. at 531–32. Respondents also moved to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(e). Id. at 532 n.4. The 
district court granted the motion with respect to the claims made by the recently 
deceased Henry Pfeil but denied the motion with respect to LaVonne Pfeil’s 
claims. Id. It is also worth noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court majority, 
relying on Hosanna-Tabor, clarified that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did 
not act as a jurisdictional bar. Id. at 535. However, the majority did not go so far as 
to categorize the doctrine as an affirmative defense. Id.  
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proceedings.156 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court sought to 
determine whether adjudicating the Pfeils’ claims would amount to 
an “excessive governmental entanglement with religion”157 or 
involve “an internal church decision that affect[ed] the faith and 
mission of the church itself.”158 
B. Minnesota Supreme Court Decision and Dissent 
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Pfeils primarily 
argued that adjudication of certain claims would not violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.159 By analyzing each 
claim separately, the court could circumvent the First Amendment 
issue by using neutral principles of law on the permissible claims.160 
By doing so, respondents’ First Amendment rights would still be 
sufficiently protected.161 Respondents countered that adjudicating 
any of the claims would violate the First Amendment,162 given “the 
religious context in which the statements were made.”163 
Adjudicating church statements made in disciplinary proceedings, 
respondents argued, would have a chilling effect on future 
speech.164 
The majority agreed with respondents and held that the 
statement-by-statement approach advocated by the Pfeils would 
violate the First Amendment because it would foster an excessive 
entanglement of government with religion.165 Accordingly, the 
court affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the Pfeils’ 
claims.166 In doing so, the majority reasoned that differentiating 
 156.  Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered 
Augsburg Confession, No. A14-0605, 2015 WL 134055, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 
12, 2015), aff’d, 877 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2016). 
 157.  Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 537 (quoting Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of 
Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 435 (Minn. 2002)). 
 158.  Id. (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012)). 
 159.  Id. at 537–38. Although the Pfeils acknowledged that most of their claims 
could not serve as the basis for a defamation claim, they argued that four of the 
claims could still be adjudicated in a constitutional manner. Id. at 538. 
 160.  See id. at 537–38. 
 161.  See id. at 539. 
 162.  Id. at 536. 
 163.  Id. at 538.  
 164.  See id. at 539. 
 165.  Id. at 542. 
 166.  Id. 
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between religious and secular statements might require the court 
to interpret church doctrine, which would amount to an 
unconstitutional entanglement of government with religion.167 
Furthermore, the court feared that adjudicating claims on a 
statement-by-statement basis would act as an incentive for a 
religious organization to—in order to avoid litigation—justify every 
decision under the guise of church doctrine.168 
The dissenting opinion rejected the notion that merely 
determining whether or not a claim excessively entangles the court 
is, in and of itself, excessive entanglement.169 The dissent stated that 
because the United States Supreme Court had never decided an 
analogous case,170 the majority’s holding directly contradicted the 
precedent established in Odenthal.171 Accordingly, the dissent 
argued that the court could have, and should have, used neutral 
principles of law to determine whether defamation had occurred.172 
Additionally, the dissent advocated for the use of a qualified 
privilege to balance the relative rights of a defamed party and a 
religious organization.173 
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Neutral Principles of Law 
The Minnesota Supreme Court erred in holding that the 
adjudication of any of the Pfeils’ claims would necessarily amount 
to an excessive entanglement with religion and therefore violate 
the First Amendment. The majority should have reversed and 
remanded the case to the district court, and it should have 
instructed the lower court to use neutral principles of law in 
determining which statements could be adjudicated without 
implicating the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.174 
A court has two options when deciding a dispute involving a 
church disciplinary proceeding: (1) it may defer to the religious 
tribunal’s ruling; or (2) if the dispute does not require the court to 
 167.  See id. at 538. 
 168.  Id. at 539. 
 169.  See id. at 544 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
 170.  Id. at 543. 
 171.  Id. at 542. 
 172.  Id. at 546. 
 173.  Id. at 545. 
 174.  Id. at 546. 
23
Krahn: Constitutional Law: If These Walls Could Talk: Giving Undue Defer
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
  
2017] PFEIL V. ST. MATTHEWS LUTHERAN CHURCH 327 
decipher issues of an ecclesiastical nature, it may use neutral 
principles of law to make a decision.175 In deciding Pfeil, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court ignored the analytical framework it had 
established in Odenthal v. Minnesota Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists. As a result, Odenthal and Pfeil adopted conflicting 
holdings,176 thereby diluting the doctrine of stare decisis.177 
In Odenthal, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the 
district court did not entangle itself with religion by determining 
whether a minister met the statutory definition of an “unlicensed 
mental health practitioner.”178 Even though the claim was in a 
religious context, the district court was permitted to use neutral 
principles of law because the statutory definition was neutral on its 
face and did not involve religious principles.179 Similarly, one of the 
statements in Pfeil, the allegation that Behnke accused the Pfeils of 
saying Behnke had stolen church funds,180 can be resolved without 
implicating church doctrine by using the neutral law of 
 175.  Cf. Isaac A. McBeth & Jennifer R. Sykes, Comment, The Unavoidable 
Ecclesiastical Collision in Virginia, 14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 509, 521 (2011) 
(explaining how courts use these same two approaches in the related context of 
church property disputes). 
 176.  Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 544 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in Odenthal 
hints that adjudicating a particular kind of state tort claim is entangling per se. To 
the contrary, it requires that we analyze state tort claims on a claim-by-claim 
basis.”). 
 177.  Id. The doctrine of stare decisis is crucial to the judiciary, lending both 
certainty and legitimacy to the judicial process. See generally Jordan Wilder 
Connors, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied to Judicial 
Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681 (2008) (discussing the merits of stare decisis 
and its role in legitimizing judicial review). 
 178.  See Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 
426, 438 (Minn. 2002); see also MINN. STAT. § 148B.60, subdiv. 3 (1998) (repealed 
2003) (statutory definition of “unlicensed mental health practitioner”). 
 179.  See Odenthal, 649 N.W.2d at 438; see also State v. Wenthe, 839 N.W.2d 83, 
90 (Minn. 2014) (“No entanglement problem exists . . . when civil courts use 
neutral principles of law—rules or standards that have been developed and are 
applied without particular regard to religious institutions or doctrines—to resolve 
disputes even though those disputes involve religious institutions or actors.”); 
Tubra v. Cooke, 225 P.3d 862, 872 (Or. App. 2010) (“If, however, the statements 
. . . do not concern the religious beliefs and practices of the religious organization 
. . . then the First Amendment does not necessarily prevent adjudication of the 
defamation claim . . . .”). 
 180.  Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Unaltered Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528 (2016) (No. 
A14-0605), 2015 WL 5000489, at *25. 
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defamation.181 Even though the claim may have originated in a 
religious context, the claim is secular in nature because its 
determination does not involve matters of religious doctrine or 
polity.182 Whether or not the claim was defamatory has nothing to 
do with “an internal church decision that affects the faith and 
mission of the church itself.”183 
Indeed, courts outside of Minnesota have been willing to 
distinguish secular claimsspecifically, defamationfrom those 
involving religion. In Miles v. Perry, a church secretary was accused 
of misappropriating church funds by the pastor and board of 
trustees.184 These accusations were made by the pastor and board of 
trustees within the context of a church board meeting.185 The 
Connecticut Appellate Court declined to dismiss the plaintiff’s 
defamation claim,186 reasoning that the defamatory accusations 
were actionable per se because they involved “a crime involving 
moral turpitude”187 and referred to “improper conduct or lack of 
skill or integrity in one’s profession.”188 In other words, the court 
determined that analysis of church doctrine was not required in 
order to find that the accusations were defamatory. 
Similarly, in St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, a 
pastor accused two church employees of carrying on an affair.189 
The accusation spread to members of the church, leading to the 
 181.  In order to recover for a defamatory statement, a plaintiff must prove: 
(1) statement was communicated to someone other than plaintiff; (2) statement 
was false; (3) statement harmed plaintiff’s reputation; and (4) statement is not 
protected by a qualified privilege. See Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 
252, 255–57 (Minn. 1980) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558–59 
(AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
 182.  See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–04 (1979) (explaining that there is 
no entanglement issue when neutral principles of law are applied without regard 
to religious institutions or doctrines); cf. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976).  
 183.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 707 (2012). 
184.  529 A.2d 199, 202 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).  
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at 213. 
 187.  Id. at 209 (citing Proto v. Bridgeport Herald Corp., 72 A.2d 820, 825 
(Conn. 1950)). 
 188.  Id. (quoting Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 116 A.2d 440, 
444 (Conn. 1955)). 
189.  568 A.2d 35, 36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). 
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dismissal of the plaintiff, one of the accused employees.190 After 
suing for defamation and invasion of privacy, the plaintiff was 
awarded more than $300,000 in compensatory and punitive 
damages191 even though the defamatory statements were uttered 
within the church context. And in Marshall v. Munro, the plaintiff, 
an ordained minister, was denied a job with a church based on 
derogatory information the church had received.192 The plaintiff 
was accused of being divorced, being dishonest, being “unable to 
perform pastoral duties due to throat surgery,” and making 
improper advances at a church member.193 Although the Alaska 
Supreme Court declined to rule on the plaintiff’s breach of 
contract claim,194 the claims of defamation and interference with 
contract were considered.195 Noting that courts “have a duty to 
adjudicate in neutral terms . . . without resolving underlying 
religious issues,”196 the court ruled that the defamation and 
interference with contract claims could be severed from the 
impermissible claims.197 While both the plaintiff and the defendant 
were pastors, the claims of defamation and interference with 
contract did not implicate the plaintiff’s “qualifications or the 
qualifications required of pastors in general.”198 
In an even more liberal use of the neutral principles of law 
doctrine, the Iowa Supreme Court refused to summarily dismiss a 
plaintiff’s defamation claim in the church context.199 In Kliebenstein 
v. Iowa Conference of United Methodist Church, a United Methodist
Church district superintendent accused the plaintiff of embodying 
 190.  Id. at 36–37. 
 191.  Id. at 37. Although the case was later remanded to the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals, it was done so in order to affirm the ruling of the Circuit Court. 
Id. at 43. 
192.  845 P.2d 424, 425 (Alaska 1993). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. at 428. The court reasoned that determining whether the defendant 
“breached a covenant of good faith would require the court to interpret Marshall’s 
and Munro’s employment relationship.” Id. Therefore, the court could not 
adjudicate the claim because the First Amendment does not permit courts “to 
imply contractual duties on religious entities.” Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 426.  
 197.  See id. at 428. (“There is no difficulty in separating the contract claim 
from the tort claims of defamation and interference with contract.”). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  See Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conference of the United Methodist Church, 663 
N.W.2d 404, 408 (Iowa 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 977 (2003). 
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the “spirit of Satan.”200 The issue before the court was whether the 
phrase “spirit of Satan” had a secular meaning that could be used 
without interpreting church doctrine.201 After consulting the 
dictionary, the court determined that words such as “Satan,” 
“satanic,” and “devil” all carried secular and sectarian meanings 
and could therefore be analyzed “without treading on—or wading 
into—religious doctrine.”202 Given the secular meaning of these 
words, the ecclesiastical abstention issue could be avoided.203 
Although courts differ as to the method of analysis to be used 
in a state tort claim against religious organizations,204 Odenthal 
made it clear that Minnesota had already approved of the 
statement-by-statement approach advocated by many other states.205 
Because there is no United States Supreme Court case that deals 
with the issue in Pfeil,206 the Minnesota Supreme Court should have 
applied the framework set in Odenthal207 to analyze the Pfeils’ claims 
on a statement-by-statement basis. 
 200.  Id. at 405.  
 201.  Id. at 407. 
 202.  Id. at 407–08. Although “spirit of Satan” was not defined in the 
dictionary, the court was content to combine other words that amounted to the 
same meaning. Id. Because these words could also be used in a secular context, the 
court did not have to “resort to theological reflection.” Id. at 407. 
 203.  See id. at 407–08. In addition to the secular meaning of these words, the 
court emphasized that any ecclesiastical protection was weakened because the 
alleged defamatory statement was disseminated to church members and non-
members alike. Id. at 407 (quoting Brewer v. Second Baptist Church of L.A., 197 
P.2d 713, 717 (1948)) (“The fact that Swinton’s communication about Jane was 
published outside the congregation weakens this ecclesiastical shield. First, 
otherwise privileged communications may be lost upon proof of excess publication 
or publication ‘beyond the group interest.’”).  
 204.  Compare Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran of Unaltered 
Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 537 n.9 (Minn. 2016) (citing examples of 
courts that have declined to adjudicate defamation claims arising out of a church 
disciplinary proceeding), with id. at n.10 (citing examples of states that have 
adopted a claim-by-claim approach to adjudicating alleged torts made in the 
church context). 
 205.  See Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 
426, 441 (Minn. 2002) (“Because these standards appear to be neutral with respect 
to religion, they can be applied without excessive entanglement.”). 
 206.  Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 534.  
 207.  Odenthal, 649 N.W.2d at 440–43. 
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B. Extending the Scope of the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine to Avoid 
a “Complicated and Messy Inquiry” 
It is clear that several state courts have analyzed defamation 
claims arising out of a church disciplinary proceeding on a claim-
by-claim basis.208 Rather than follow the analysis advocated by 
numerous states and its own framework in Odenthal, the Pfeil court 
announced a new rule that extended the ecclesiastical abstention 
doctrine beyond what is required by United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.209 
In order to avoid a “complicated and messy inquiry,”210 the 
majority relied heavily on Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School v. EEOC.211 However, Pfeil presented facts and issues that 
were not addressed in Hosanna-Tabor.212 The holding in Hosanna-
Tabor was not meant to extend beyond employment discrimination 
suits involving ministerial employees.213 Grounding the Pfeil 
 208.  See, e.g., Connor v. Archdiocese of Phila., 975 A.2d 1084, 1113 (Pa. 2009) 
(holding that a court should analyze each individual claim to determine whether it 
was “reasonably likely” that the plaintiff could meet its burden of proof without 
intruding into the “sacred precincts”); Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist Church, 750 
S.E.2d 605, 608 (S.C. 2013) (holding that statements made during a church 
disciplinary hearing were independent of religious doctrine and therefore could 
be adjudicated using neutral principles of law); Bowie v. Murphy, 624 S.E.2d 74, 
(Va. 2006) (holding that a defamation claim based on an alleged instance of 
assault did not involve matters of church governance); see also supra notes 184–203 
and accompanying text. 
 209.  Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 542 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).  
 210.  Id. at 538 (majority opinion). 
 211.  See id. at 534–35, 540. 
 212.  Compare id. at 536–42 (determining whether a court can use neutral 
principles of law to adjudicate a defamation claim in the context of a church 
disciplinary proceeding), with Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707–10 (2012) (determining whether an 
employment discrimination claim in a religious context would result in 
“government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith 
and mission of the church itself,” thereby precluding adjudication through the 
ministerial exception). 
 213.  See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 
274 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 
1557 (2016). Although Priests for Life was later vacated and remanded by Zubik, 
there is nothing to suggest that the opinion of the Supreme Court has changed 
regarding its hesitance to extend the holding in Hosanna-Tabor. Priests for Life dealt 
with a challenge to contraceptive coverage in the Affordable Care Act and did not 
deal directly with the ministerial exception. See 772 F.3d at 235. 
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decision in a case that did not address the same issues was 
misguided. 
Likewise, the Pfeil majority’s reliance on Black v. Snyder214 and 
Schoenhals v. Mains215 was unfounded.216 In Snyder, the court refused 
to adjudicate a pastor’s defamation claim because it was made in 
the context of a church employment decision and therefore 
triggered the ministerial exception.217 However, the court did allow 
the pastor to bring a sexual-harassment claim because the claim did 
not involve scrutiny of church doctrine or interfere with church 
employment decisions.218 In Mains, the court refused to hear a 
defamation claim because the alleged statements involved matters 
of church doctrine and discipline.219 However, the court suggested 
that one of the claims—being engaged in the “direct fabrication of 
lies with the intent to hurt the reputation” of the church—
appeared neutral on its face and could possibly be adjudicated 
without interpreting church doctrine.220 Accordingly, it is clear that 
the Pfeil court could have adjudicated claims presented before it 
while still being consistent with the holdings in Snyder and Mains. 
Defamation law, which is neutral on its face, could have been 
applied to the claim relating to stealing church funds because the 
claim did not implicate the ministerial exception and did not 
involve matters of church doctrine and discipline.221 
C. Judicial Policy Making 
As Justice Lillehaug appropriately noted in his Pfeil dissent, the 
process of deciding whether government is excessively entangled 
with religion does not necessarily amount to excessive 
entanglement.222 Indeed, courts are often required to make 
 214.  471 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Aug. 
29, 1991). 
215.  504 N.W.2d 233, 234–36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 216.  See Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 535–36 (discussing the lower courts’ approvals of 
Black v. Snyder and Schoenhals v. Mains). 
 217.  Black, 471 N.W.2d at 720. 
 218.  See id. at 721; see also Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United 
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that 
adjudication of an employment contract claim is permissible if the plaintiff can 
prove that the contract was breached without examining church doctrine). 
 219.  See Schoenhals, 504 N.W.2d at 234–36. 
 220.  Id. at 236. 
 221.  Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 546 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
 222.  Id. at 544. 
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inquiries that involve religious doctrine;223 this in itself does not 
violate the First Amendment.224 An example of this preliminary 
examination appears in cases involving the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).225 In one such case, United States v. 
Meyers,226 the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess and 
distribute marijuana.227 The defendant claimed to be the founder 
and Reverend of the “Church of Marijuana,” a religion that 
commanded him to “use, possess, grow and distribute marijuana 
for the good of mankind and the planet earth.”228 In order to 
decide whether this practice was protected by RFRA, the court had 
to determine whether the teachings of the “Church of Marijuana” 
fell under RFRA’s definition of “religious beliefs.”229 Ultimately, the 
court determined that the defendant’s beliefs amounted to a 
personal philosophy and were therefore not protected by RFRA.230 
As some commentators have noted, determining what 
practices are “religious” is essential to both Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.231 In order to do so, there 
must be a certain level of flexibility for the judiciary to determine 
 223.  Gardner, supra note 76, at 258 (“Courts are routinely required to 
examine religious doctrines in order to determine whether a certain practice is 
‘religious’ for the purposes of the First Amendment and various other laws that 
deal with religion.”); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) 
(discussing the need to examine the doctrine and practice of the Amish religion 
before determining whether respondents’ beliefs were “religious” and “sincere”). 
 224.  See Overstreet, supra note 95, at 291 n.129 (citing cases that have 
distinguished between permissible judicial intrusion and excessive judicial 
involvement). 
225.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1994). 
226.  95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 227.  Id. at 1479. 
 228.  Id.  
 229.  See id. at 1481–84. 
 230.  See id. at 1484 (“[W]e hold that Meyers’ beliefs more accurately espouse a 
philosophy and/or way of life rather than a ‘religion.’ The district court did not 
err in prohibiting Meyers’ religious freedom defense.”); see also Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, 
may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it 
is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion 
Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.”). 
 231.  See Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1959–60 
(2001) (arguing that prohibiting courts from making initial inquiries related to 
religious beliefs would result in “killing the free exercise with kindness” and “a 
weakened Establishment Clause”). 
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whether a law will inhibit religious freedom or whether it will 
excessively entangle government with religion.232 If, after making 
this inquiry, there is no entanglement, then there is no 
“compulsory deference to religious authority.”233 
Because the Pfeil court did not have to completely defer to the 
religious authority of the respondents, its holding appears to be the 
result of an intentional policy choice.234 By granting a religious 
actor an almost unlimited opportunity to defame during 
disciplinary proceedings, the court essentially balanced a defamed 
victim’s right to recovery with a church’s right to discipline its 
members and ruled that the scales of justice tipped toward the 
interests of the church.235 The majority did not consider how its 
decision might apply to scenarios involving a defamed victim’s right 
to remedy; but at the same time, the majority seemed very 
concerned as to the “chilling effect” that a statement-by-statement 
analysis may have on a religious actor’s speech.236 And although a 
church’s right to discipline is important to its freedom of religion, 
adjudicating a valid defamation claim does not interfere with that 
freedom. There is no need for the First Amendment to “str[ike] 
the balance” in this case.237 
D. Future Ramifications 
By refusing to consider otherwise valid claims because of the 
religious context in which they arose,238 the Pfeil decision effectively 
allows a person to freely defame another in certain contexts. The 
gravity of this decision leads one to question if more extreme 
defamatory statements or other tortious acts might be permissible 
 232.  See id. 
233.  Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979). 
 234.  Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered 
Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 545 (Minn. 2016) (Lillehaug, J., 
dissenting). 
 235.  See id. at 541 (majority opinion). 
 236.  Compare id. at 539 (arguing that the separation of “religious” claims and 
“secular” claims could lead to a restraint of speech), with id. at 540 n.12 
(“Although we recognize the dissent’s concerns regarding future cases, it would be 
inappropriate to speculate on how the First Amendment may apply to hypothetical 
facts that are not before us.”). 
 237.  Id. at 542 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. 
v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012)) (“[T]he First Amendment has struck the
balance for us.”). 
 238.  Id. 
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in a church disciplinary setting.239 It is unclear, for example, 
whether a plaintiff could seek a remedy after being accused of 
sexual assault in a church disciplinary proceeding.240 Furthermore, 
the evident conflict between Odenthal and Pfeil—both Minnesota 
Supreme Court decisions—may lead future courts to make 
inconsistent decisions.241 Likewise, the Pfeil court’s willingness to 
extend the historically limited benefit of absolute privilege is 
concerning. 
1. Expanding the Narrow Applications of Absolute Privilege in
Minnesota
Permitting a religious actor to defame another in a religious 
context, as the Pfeil decision does, essentially amounts to an 
absolute privilege.242 But as Minnesota courts have emphasized, 
absolute privilege has “narrow limits”243 and is granted only “when 
public policy weighs strongly in favor of such extension.”244 In other 
words, only in cases “in which the public service or the 
administration of justice requires complete immunity” will this 
 239.  See id. at 546 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is difficult to discern why 
the court’s categorical rule of law insulating religious actors from defamation 
claims would not extend to and insulate those actors from liability for other 
torts.”). 
 240.  See id. at 544. 
 241.  Cases involving similar facts and law sometimes lead to seemingly 
contradictory results, which can lead to confusion in the legal community. Even 
the highest court in the land is not immune from handing down inconsistent 
decisions, as evidenced in some of its First Amendment jurisprudence. Compare 
McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 873–74 (2005) (holding that the 
presence of framed copies of the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky 
courthouses had a predominantly religious purpose, and therefore violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 
677, 691–92 (2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments monument displayed on 
the grounds of the Texas State Capitol did not amount to an unconstitutional 
government endorsement of religion). 
 242.  Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 542 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). Privileges in the 
defamation context are “divided into two categories: absolute and qualified.” Erica 
Holzer, Torts: Striking A Balance: Minnesota’s Minority Stance on the Privilege to Defame–
Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 2010), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 559, 561 
(2011) (citing Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416 
(1954)). 
 243.  See Matthis, 243 Minn. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 417. 
244.  Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Minn. 2010). 
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privilege be extended.245 Church disciplinary proceedings do not 
constitute, and have never constituted, an area that requires 
complete immunity. Accordingly, the Pfeil majority departed from 
precedent by extending absolute privilege to protect church 
officials in the disciplinary context. Examining current applications 
of absolute privilege demonstrates this misstep. 
One notable application of absolute privilege, where public 
policy strongly favors such an extension, is to federal legislative,246 
judicial,247 and executive248 officials. In these contexts, the privilege 
works to enable federal officials to speak freely while performing 
their governmental duties.249 The rationale for such a protection is 
not, as one might assume, to shield certain exalted individuals250 
but rather to promote the public welfare by giving officials the 
freedom to run a functioning government.251 
To varying degrees, states have also extended absolute 
privilege to government officials. When given the chance,252 
Minnesota courts have erred on the side of limiting absolute 
 245.  See Matthis, 243 Minn. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 417. 
 246.  Freedom of speech within the legislature has always been a pillar of 
United States democracy, as evidenced by its inclusion in the Constitution: 
[Members of Congress] shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and 
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance 
at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning 
from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they 
shall not be questioned in any other Place. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Every state has acknowledged this legislative privilege 
in one way or another, see Holzer, supra note 242, at 566, including Minnesota. See 
MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (“For any speech or debate in either house [members 
of each house] shall not be questioned in any other place.”). However, even 
legislative officials have a limit to the privilege they are afforded. See Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130 (1979) (holding that defamatory statements 
disseminated in newsletters and press releases were not “essential to the 
deliberations of the Senate” and therefore were not protected speech). 
 247.  See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871). 
 248.  See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).  
 249.  See Holzer, supra note 242, at 565. 
 250.  See id. at 566–67. 
 251.  See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572–73 (1959) (“The privilege is not a 
badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to 
aid in the effective functioning of government.”). 
 252.  See Holzer, supra note 242, at 572 (“Within Minnesota, courts have 
repeatedly faced the decision of whether to join this growing trend [of extending 
instances of absolute privilege], or maintain the ‘narrow limits’ Minnesota has 
placed on absolute privilege since it became a state.”). 
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privilege and confining it within the “narrow limits” that have 
historically been granted.253 Even as other jurisdictions have, at 
times, been more generous in extending absolute privilege,254 
Minnesota has generally extended this privilege to legislative, 
judicial, and executive officials, but only when a strong public 
policy is served by granting absolute privilege.255 
In Minnesota, legislators are granted absolute privilege via the 
Minnesota Constitution.256 The relevant section provides that 
members of the Minnesota legislature “shall be privileged from 
arrest during the session of their respective houses” and “shall not 
be questioned” while acting in an official capacity.257 Given the 
inclusion of these provisions in the state’s Constitution, it is clear 
that the drafters recognized the need for legislators to speak freely 
in order to best serve the public. In other words, the strong public 
policy that is served by extending the privilege to legislators is that 
it is necessary to prevent legislators from becoming mired in 
litigation, which would inevitably distract them from their duty to 
the public.258 Furthermore, the timidity that would result from an 
unprivileged environment would prevent legislators from being 
completely forthcoming, thereby harming the public by limiting 
access to the truth.259 For these reasons, it is clear that this area falls 
within the “narrow limits” of absolute privilege. 
Absolute privilege extends to judicial branch officials in 
Minnesota. In Matthis v. Kennedy,260 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that defamatory statements made in the course of a judicial 
proceeding261 are absolutely privileged if they are related to the 
subject matter of the proceeding.262 The court reasoned that this 
extensive protection satisfied the strong public policy of allowing 
parties and their attorneys to be free to defend their causes in court 
 253.  See id. at 573. 
 254.  See id. at 571 nn.92–94. 
 255.  Id. at 573. 
 256.  MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10. 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  See Holzer, supra note 242, at 567. 
 259.  See id. 
260.  243 Minn. 219, 67 N.W.2d 413 (1954). 
 261.  See id. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 417. A judicial proceeding, according to the 
Matthis court, includes not only trials, but also any “proceeding of a judicial 
nature.” Id. 
 262.  See id. at 219, 67 N.W.2d at 414. 
34
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/8
  
338 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
without fear of being subjected to future lawsuits for libel and 
slander.263 Thus, absolute privilege is necessary in this context. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court also extended absolute 
privilege to high-level state executive officials, something that was 
done on the federal level almost a century earlier by the United 
States Supreme Court264 and recommended by the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.265 In Johnson v. Dirkswager,266 a hospital supervisor 
sued Minnesota’s Commissioner of Public Welfare for defamation, 
among other claims.267 The lawsuit concerned a telephone 
interview between the Commissioner and a newspaper reporter in 
which the Commissioner revealed that the hospital supervisor had 
been terminated from his position because of “sexual 
improprieties.”268 In ruling in favor of the Commissioner, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the absolute privilege 
enjoyed by legislative and judicial representatives should also be 
extended to top-level executive officials.269 Therefore, the 
statements communicated by the Commissioner to the newspaper 
reporter were protected because they were made in the course of 
his official duty.270 According to the court, the public is better 
served when executive officials are free to speak out in the 
performance of their duties.271 But Minnesota courts have 
consistently limited this privilege to high-ranking executive 
officials.272 
However, one notable exception that does extend absolute 
privilege to low-level executive officials was formulated in Carradine 
v. State.273 In Carradine, a motorist sued a Minnesota state trooper
 263.  See id. The court also noted that the privilege extended not only to 
attorneys but to parties and witnesses as well. Id. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 417. 
 264.  See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498–99 (1896). 
 265.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 591 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
266.  315 N.W.2d 215 (Minn. 1982). 
 267.  See id. at 217.  
 268.  See id. This information was published the next day in the Minneapolis 
Tribune. Id. 
 269.  See id. at 221 (“It seems to us that the same policy considerations that 
warrant an absolute privilege for those in the legislative and judicial branches of 
government apply to the executive branch.”). 
 270.  See id. 
 271.  See id. 
 272.  See, e.g., Holzer, supra note 242, at 573 n.105 (describing examples of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court declining to extend absolute privilege to lower level 
government employees). 
273.  511 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1994). 
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for making allegedly defamatory statements in his arrest report.274 
While noting that police officers were not necessarily “high level” 
executive officials, the court’s opinion did not turn on whether or 
not absolute privilege should be given to “low level” employees.275 
Instead, the court’s inquiry was whether making an arrest report 
was a key part of a state trooper’s duties.276 Because the court 
determined that this was indeed an important part of an officer’s 
duties, an officer would be protected from any defamation claim 
that may arise out of a written arrest report.277 Accordingly, the 
public policy of allowing a government official to perform 
confidently—which, ultimately, benefits the public—remained 
intact.278 
The holding in Carradine acted as an exception to the court’s 
preference of limiting absolute privilege, but the case should not 
be read as exhibiting willingness to extend this privilege to other 
areas. Indeed, the Carradine court, while extending absolute 
privilege to statements made in arrest reports, also held that a 
qualified privilege was sufficient for police statements to the 
media.279 The Carradine decision was not meant to create a broad 
application of absolute privilege. Thus, the court maintained its 
narrow application of the privilege. 
As the above cases reveal, Minnesota courts’ extension of 
absolute privilege has been very narrow. At no point have these 
courts gone so far as to extend this far-reaching privilege to church 
disciplinary proceedings, and for good reason: communications 
within the church do not implicate the public to the same extent as 
government proceedings. The rationale for the privilege in the 
 274.  See id. at 734. In the arrest report, the police officer described the 
motorist’s conduct as involving “speeding, reckless driving, fleeing an officer, and 
impersonating an officer.” Id.  
 275.  See id. at 735. 
 276.  See id. at 736 (“Whether an executive officer is absolutely immune from 
defamation liability depends on many factors, including the nature of the function 
assigned to the officer and the relationship of the statements to the performance 
of that function.”). 
 277.  See id. at 736–37. Without this freedom to write a detailed and accurate 
report, the court reasoned, police officers would become more hesitant and less 
forthcoming, which could affect the usefulness of the report in subsequent 
prosecution. Id. at 736. 
 278.  See id. at 735. 
 279.  See id. at 737 (“[W]e conclude that not all statements made to the press 
by an arresting officer such as Trooper Chase are absolutely privileged.”). 
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government setting is to promote the public welfare by 
encouraging open communication, even if it is, at times, 
defamatory. There is no such justification in the church 
disciplinary context. Open communication between church leaders 
and church members is, of course, a desirable goal, but protecting 
defamatory statements made in this setting is not supported by any 
strong public policy. Given the absence of justification in the 
church setting and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s tradition of 
hesitancy in this area, the Pfeil court should not have been so quick 
to extend what essentially amounts to an absolute privilege to 
defame. 
2. Balancing Interests of Church and Defamed Victim Through a
Qualified Privilege
By essentially granting a church actor carte blanche to defame 
within the church, the Pfeil majority did not adequately account for 
the devastating impact that a defamatory statement may have on its 
victim.280 Statements made in private conversations, particularly 
contentious ones, cannot be expected to stay private.281 
A better alternative would be to create a qualified privilege for 
communications during church disciplinary proceedings.282 Such a 
privilege is recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts283 and 
used in other jurisdictions to balance the rights of a defamed victim 
and the rights of a religious organization.284 When applied to Pfeil, a 
qualified privilege would have protected all of the communications 
that were religious in nature while still allowing the court to 
determine if the privilege was abused in making the non-religious 
 280.  See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 2010) (“[D]efamatory 
speech . . . can be personally crushing and career-ending.”); Holzer, supra note 
242, at 564 (“Victims of defamatory speech, for example, are subject to hatred, 
ridicule, obloquy, and contempt.”). 
 281.  See Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered 
Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 545 (Minn. 2016) (Lillehaug, J., 
dissenting) (“This proviso ignores the reality of how defamation can devastate its 
victims. Any statement made in a closed meeting of ‘members’ and ‘participants’ is 
unlikely to stay there.”). 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977) 
(“[Qualified privilege is available] for communications among [members of a 
religious organization] concerning the qualifications of the officers and members 
and their participation in the activities of the society.”). 
 284.  See, e.g., Rankin v. Phillippe, 211 A.2d 56, 58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965). 
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statements. Thus, the privilege would have respected both the 
church’s right to speech and the defamed victim’s right to a 
remedy. 
A qualified privilege, like an absolute privilege, protects 
statements made in certain contexts.285 Rather than inhibit speech, 
these privileges act to encourage it—even when the speech might 
be defamatory.286 The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously 
stated the elements and effects of qualified privilege: 
The law is that a communication, to be privileged, must 
be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, 
and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause. 
When so made in good faith, the law does not imply 
malice from the communication itself, as in the ordinary 
case of libel. Actual malice must be proved, before there 
can be a recovery, and in the absence of such proof the 
plaintiff cannot recover.287 
The difference between the two privileges lies in the amount of 
protection offered. An absolute privilege bars liability for even 
intentionally false statements made with actual malice, while a 
qualified privilege bars liability only when the statement is made in 
good faith and without malice.288 In other words, a qualified 
privilege ceases to act as a safeguard if it is abused.289 
 285.  Minke v. City of Minneapolis, 845 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Minn. 2014) (citing 
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 1986)). 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  See Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 256–57 (Minn. 
1980) (quoting Hebner v. Great N. Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 292, 80 N.W. 1128, 1129 
(1899)); see also Ferrell v. Cross, 557 N.W.2d 560, 565 (Minn. 1997); Wirig v. 
Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 380 (Minn. 1990). 
288.  Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1954). 
 289.  Id. (“[A] qualified or conditional privilege grants immunity only if the 
privilege is not abused . . . .”); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 115, at 832 (5th ed. 1984) (“[Qualified] immunity is 
forfeited if the defendant steps outside of the scope of the privilege, or abuses the 
occasion.”). There are four ways in which an actor can abuse this protection. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 599 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (citations 
omitted) (stating that a qualified privilege may be abused: (1) because of the 
publisher’s knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity of the defamatory 
matter; (2) because the defamatory matter is published for some purpose other 
than that for which the particular privilege is given; (3) because of excessive 
publication; or (4) because the publication includes defamatory matter not 
reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the 
occasion is privileged). 
38
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss1/8
  
342 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
Indeed, a similar privilege was granted in Minnesota for 
communications in the context of employment.290 An example of 
this appears in Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., where the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that a supervisor forfeited his qualified 
privilege when he acted with malice while speaking about the 
character of his former employee, the plaintiff.291 The supervisor 
had indicated that he was confident in the employee’s capabilities 
as a salesperson and that he would give a good recommendation to 
prospective employers.292 However, when the supervisor was called 
upon to give his recommendation, he referred to the plaintiff as a 
poor salesperson who was hard to motivate.293 While the court 
recognized that an employer should be able to speak freely while 
acting as a reference for a former employee, the court determined 
that this freedom ends when the employer undercuts the former 
employee with malice and bad faith.294 
The same policy guiding Stuempges should apply in the context 
of church disciplinary proceedings. Religious actors should be able 
to speak freely about matters of church doctrine and should be 
protected when doing so. However, when a harmful claim is made 
about a church member that does not implicate religious law or 
polity, the claim should be evaluated to determine if it was 
defamatory. Applying a qualified privilege in this situation, as the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has done in the context of employment, 
should help assuage any First Amendment concerns. 
The reluctance of the Pfeil majority to extend a qualified 
privilege seems to hinge on the possibility that litigation may be 
prolonged to determine if the privilege was abused.295 However, 
defamation suits are often prolonged in order to make this 
abuse/non-abuse determination.296 Determining whether a 
 290.  See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 889–90; Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 256–57 (Minn. 
1980); McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 306 Minn. 93, 97, 235 N.W.2d 371, 374 
(1975). 
 291.  Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 258, 260. 
 292.  See id. at 256. 
 293.  See id. at 255. 
 294.  See id at 258. 
 295.  Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered 
Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 540 n.11 (Minn. 2016) (“[D]etermining 
whether a statement is entitled to the protection of a qualified privilege requires 
extensive litigation.”). 
 296.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 890 
(Minn. 1986); Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 258. 
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statement is protected by a qualified privilege does not have to be 
an extensive, time-consuming ordeal. Minnesota courts already do 
this in the context of employment.297 Although there are valid 
distinctions between an employment case and a case involving 
religious organizations, length of trial is not one of them. The 
minimal time it would take to make this determination should not 
be used as justification for denying a defamed victim a right to a 
remedy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Pfeil, the court was asked to determine whether adjudicating 
the Pfeils’ defamation claim would excessively entangle the 
government with religion, thereby violating the First 
Amendment.298 Although courts have historically been reluctant to 
extend absolute privileges,299 the Pfeil court’s affirmation of the 
lower courts’ holdings essentially granted a church actor an 
absolute privilege to defame in church disciplinary proceedings. To 
avoid any possible entanglement issue, it appears the court gave 
automatic deference to respondents merely because of their 
religious connection.300 The majority failed to use the Odenthal 
framework of analyzing each state tort claim on a claim-by-claim 
 297.  See supra notes 290–94 and accompanying text. 
 298.  Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 536–37.  
299.  Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 2010) (“Absolute privilege is 
not lightly granted and applies only in limited circumstances.”); see Holzer, supra 
note 242, at 572–73.  
 300.  See Magarian, supra note 231, at 1960 (“Absolute judicial avoidance of 
inquiries into religious substance, especially if it resulted in a weakened 
Establishment Clause, would cross the line that divides appropriate respect for 
religious autonomy from inappropriate solicitude for religious claims of 
transcendence.”); see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 
696, 734 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Milivojevich, Justice 
Rehnquist warned of the possible Establishment Clause issues that may arise from 
giving automatic deference to religious institutions: 
Such blind deference, however, is counseled neither by logic nor by 
the First Amendment. To make available the coercive powers of civil 
courts to rubber-stamp ecclesiastical decisions of hierarchical religious 
associations, when such deference is not accorded similar acts of 
secular voluntary associations, would, in avoiding the free exercise 
problems petitioners envision, itself create far more serious problems 
under the Establishment Clause. 
426 U.S. at 734. 
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basis, thereby extending the scope of the ecclesiastical abstention 
doctrine and undermining the doctrine of stare decisis.301 The 
court should have used neutral principles of law to determine 
which statements could be adjudicated without implicating the 
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. 
 301.  See Connors, supra note 177, at 681; see also Harwood, supra note 31 at 
350–51 (“[I]f the Court fails to abide by a single principle in addressing issues 
implicating a discrete area of the law, then there will be inconsistency in its 
decisions, and its jurisprudence will provide insufficient guidance to future Courts, 
lower courts, and policymakers alike.”). 
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